

Problems Identified by IG and IG Recommendations\*

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP70-00211R000800070059-1

PROBLEM	IG RECOMMENDATION	70059-1 PRIMARY COGNIZ- ANCE	ACTION TAKEN	ACTION PROPOSED	DISPOSI- TION
<p><u>Organization</u></p> <p>25X1 paragraph 9 b (16), Agency Regulation [redacted] Revised 24 February 1959, assigns responsibility for the official Agency Mail and Courier Service to the Director of Logistics. This function is performed in the Mail and Courier Branch, O/L.</p> <p>25X1 Branch has an authorized complement of [redacted] staff employees, [redacted] of whom are cleared couriers and courier supervisors. In addition to the official Mail and Courier Branch, O/L, there are independent courier systems, ranging in size [redacted] couriers, operating in the components listed below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Office of Current Intelligence</li> <li>Office of Research and Reports</li> <li>Executive Registry, Office of the Director</li> </ul> <p>25X1 [redacted]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Records Integration Division, DD/P</li> <li>Office of Training</li> <li>Office of Personnel</li> <li>Cable Secretariat</li> <li>Technical Services Division, DD/P</li> <li>Office of Security</li> <li>Office of Central Reference</li> <li>Photographic Intelligence Center, DD/I</li> <li>Development Projects Division, DD/P</li> </ul> <p>25X1 total, there are [redacted] employee courier positions in the Agency, ranging in grade from GS-4 to GS-11 (see Tab A). Special written authority permits OCI and PIC each to maintain [redacted] GS-7 couriers with special clearances for special handling and transmission of SI material and critical intelligence information on a twenty-four hour basis. The [redacted] couriers who operate independently of the official courier system are unauthorized by regula-</p>	<p>That the Management Staff conduct a study of the various courier systems at headquarters with a view of reducing duplication. (Note: By memorandum dated 12 March 1960, the DD/S issued instructions to the Chief, Management Staff, to proceed with such a study under the following terms of reference:</p> <p>"... to conduct a study of the headquarters Courier Systems for the purpose of eliminating any unnecessary duplication or overlapping of separate systems, recommending at the same time any improvements or economies in services, methods, and controls which may seem to you desirable. The detailed information gathered by the Office of Security is available to your staff.")</p> <p>(S) The DD/S instruct the Director of Security to establish a point within the Office of Security to coordinate on all matters relating to the Headquarters Courier Systems, and the individual security of couriers themselves and the Courier System.</p>	70059-1 PRIMARY COGNIZ- ANCE	ACTION TAKEN	ACTION PROPOSED	DISPOSI- TION

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25X1 tion or special authority, but justified by the using component on the basis of necessity. [redacted] are assigned to the DD/P and are for the most part performing inter-office messenger service.

25X1 Duplication of functions under divided responsibility has dissipated administrative control and increased operating costs. Headquarters Courier Services cost the Agency [redacted] in personal services alone, with less than half this amount in support of the [redacted] employees assigned to the official Mail and Courier Branch, Office of Logistics.

25X1 The existence of duplicative courier systems makes supervision and control of Agency couriers difficult and introduces unnecessary risk to the security of the Agency's operations. Multiple courier systems are conducive to undetected individual security violations; contribute to nonuniformity in practices and procedures; create staffing problems; are wasteful of manpower and transportation and make monitoring of courier operations difficult.

25X1 A single courier system [redacted] special courier system of OCI and PIC excepted) will provide tighter security and better control of Agency Courier operations.

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SECRET

## PROBLEM

## IG RECOMMENDATION

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At the present time no single office maintains a complete roster of Agency couriers. Ostensibly, this should be accomplished by the Director of Security whose current roster contains only those couriers employed by the official Mail and Courier Branch, Office of Logistics.

At the present time there is no focal point within the Office of Security to constantly deal with and actually supervise all security factors concerned with Agency couriers or courier operations. Such a focal point is needed. Couriers are a well-known channel of penetration into any intelligence service. Although this is so, there is no indication that the Agency Courier System has been penetrated nor have the actions of individual couriers established any noticeable evidence of participation in subversive activities.

Failure to requalify couriers in the use of firearms.

The IG does not endorse the OS conclusion<sup>1</sup> that the Headquarters Courier Systems are secure, until all reasonable safeguards have been applied and the Office of Security has mounted a vigorous CI operation against this activity; only then can the Agency be assured of a reasonably secure courier service. Security is achieved by constant vigilance on the part of individual

That the focal point in the Office of Security be designated the office of record for maintaining a complete roster of all headquarters couriers and courier equipment and that the Director of Security provide a staffing slot for a full-time courier inspector.

That 1) the DD/S issue a directive to all units of the Agency employing individual couriers not assigned to the Mail and Courier Branch, Office of Logistics, to provide the Office of Security their names together with a list of offices (outside CIA) visited; the courier schedule and routes; type of transport used, precautions employed to protect classified mail in transit; types of clearances issued to its couriers and to submit all subsequent changes in courier status as they occur; and 2) the Office of Logistics in coordination with the Office of Security review these data to eliminate wherever practicable duplication of courier services, courier routes, and courier vehicles.

Individuals so affected to be reported to the Office of Security for arms requalification without delay.

That the DD/S request the Director of Security to extend his current technical interrogation program to all Agency couriers; and that he be instructed to initiate a positive CI program designed to minimize the damage to National Security and embarrassment to the Agency should a serious breach of security occur.

<sup>1</sup> Based on the record of only one transmission security violation by a courier during the past three years. IG views this record neither as a guarantee of the security of courier operations in the past, nor a definite guarantee against a breach of security that

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Administration (Cont'd):  
couriers, supervisors and monitoring personnel, and by the application of sound security practices. Only one courier facility demonstrates such vigilance in daily practice -- the Special [ ] Courier Service maintained by PIC.

Failure of the Agency to equip courier vehicles with adequate facilities for the proper safeguarding of classified materials while in transit creates unnecessary security hazards; failure to provide special equipment in courier vehicles as an added precaution to safeguard classified mail during transit.

The number of individuals used on an "ad hoc" basis to speed the delivery of classified materials by the "hand-carry" method cannot be determined but is known to be extensive. There appears to be no practical way to eliminate or control this procedure. Security of documents in such cases depends upon the integrity of the individual concerned and the responsibility for compromise or loss (if reported) rests with the person or persons concerned.

Correction of the deficiencies noted in the basic survey (IG) will go far toward improving the security of Headquarters Courier Systems.

DISCUSSION  
IG RECOMMENDATION

Paragraph 11.b.(4), Agency Regulation [ ] Revised, 24 February 1959, states that the Director of Security is to, "develop and conduct internal counterintelligence programs to detect and prevent hostile penetrations of the Agency establishments through its employees." Paragraph b.(5) goes on to state that the Director of Security is to "establish safeguards necessary to prevent physical penetration of the Agency establishments by unauthorized individuals. . ." Nowhere in the regulations is specific mention made of couriers or the Agency Courier System, nor requires the Director of Security to give this activity special attention.

When courier escort is not provided, all vehicles used by couriers will be equipped with a fireproof safe for storage of classified material while in transit. Wherever feasible, a two-way radio telephone should be installed in courier vehicles.

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Personnel

Lack of uniformity in classification of positions.

That DD/S request the Director of Personnel to explore the possibility of reclassifying couriers now performing internal messenger service to the status of "messengers."

That the Director of Personnel establish a definitive job classification and requirement for Agency couriers and reclassify those engaged in purely internal mail distribution to the position of messenger.

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PLAN

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Procedures

Insecure practices and procedures most common to Agency courier operations are traced to noncompliance with Agency regulations and inadequate supervision.

There is a lack of uniformity in the use of Courier and Document Receipts in the handling of official mail and classified materials.

Failure to inventory contents when signing for receipt of bulk deliveries.

The major defect in the "hand-carry" method is its circumvention of the registry system of document control. As a result, endless hours of search through registers and offices occur when documents are reported lost or misplaced.

Failure of individuals to properly address classified mail delays transmission and leads to compromise. Unfamiliarity on the part of clerical personnel with mail regulations pertaining to the preparation of classified materials for dispatch.

Lost postage slips (registered mail).

That the Office of Security conduct a survey of the Agency's procedures for classified-document control to insure proper compliance with Executive Order 10501 and pertinent Agency regulations.

When bulk deliveries are made such as RI pouches, the recipient usually signs the Courier Receipt without inventory of the contents. To provide better document control, it is recommended that a manifest-type receipt be prepared for the contents of RI pouches, and the courier insist on inventory and receipt at time of delivery.

That an Agency handbook be prepared and published that would consolidate all official directives on the subject, and make it easier for clerical help to follow instructions by setting forth examples and illustrations.

That representatives from the Office of Logistics, Office of Personnel, and Office of Security meet to consider and adopt better



Failure of couriers to properly identify themselves when picking up classified mail.

Couriers' failure to request proper identification of the recipient of classified material.

Ineffective supervision of courier activities during mail runs. Inadequate supervision of couriers' absences.

Thirty delivery points in the Pentagon.

Under no circumstances deliver classified material to unauthorized persons.

Instruct all couriers to: (1) Deliver classified material to the addressee or authorized representative only. (2) Request proper identification from all recipients prior to delivery of classified material. (3) Under no circumstances deliver classified material to unauthorized persons.

The Chief, OCP Liaison, prepare a memorandum for all Agencies and Departments with whom couriers make contact, requesting their cooperation in asking CIA couriers to identify themselves properly before turning classified materials over to them. All offices in CIA to be similarly notified and requested to ask couriers to show their courier's identification credentials.

Provide courier-drivers with a trip manifest or similar card to report times of arrival and departure at all facilities visited. Require supervisors to take daily readings of speedometer mileage as a check against the trip manifest.

That the Office of Logistics and the Office of Security jointly investigate the feasibility and practicability of reducing the number of delivery points in the Pentagon (now numbering 30) by the establishment of a special center at the Pentagon to be manned by two or more Agency employees whose duties will include internal delivery and collections to these offices.